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1 Introduction 
Do managers overinvest in short-term projects and under-invest in long-
term projects? And if so, why? The theme of managerial misbehavior has 
attracted much attention, both in the popular press and in the academic 
literature. An argument which has enjoyed some degree of popUlarity is that 
a) Managers' horiwn is indeed too short and b) this happens because of the 
emphasis put on short-term results in evaluating managerial performance. A 
parallel argument has been that economic systems in which capital markets 
play a lesser role in corporate control turn out to be more efficient and 
long-term oriented. 
Theoretical models have looked at reputational or informational factors 
as the source of short-termism. How a concern for managerial reputation 
may lead to short-termism has been:first analyzed by Narayanan (1985). In 
his model each manager is endowed with an unobserved level of ability, and 
the market uses past performance to assess the ability of managers. Man-
agers have the possibility of taking two mutually exclusive actions, which can 
be thought of as undertaking a short-term or a long-term project. N arayanan 
shows that when such decision is unobservable, the managers may under-
take the short-run project even in cases in which the NPV of the long-term 
project is hjgher. 
Bebchuk and Stole (1993) have shown that, depending on whether the 
amount invested or the project's return are observable by investors, manage-
rial horizon can be either too short or too long. Their model take as given 
both the amount of capital available to the managers and their compensation 
scheme. 
Narayanan (1996) studies the impact of payments in cash or stock over 
managerial horizon. While he considers the problem of designing the opti-
mal compensation scheme, he makes the implicit assumption that long-term 
projects can only be financed using short-term cash flow. He shows that 
in this case inefficient under-investment in long-term projects is possible. 
Other models showing how the presence of asymmetric information may 
cause a managerial bias towards short-term projects have been proposed by 
Stein (1988, 1989). In Stein (1989) it is assumed that managers can boost 
current earnings by 'borrowing' towards future earnings at an unfavorable 
rate. This allows for financing short-term projects by borrowing money in 
capitallli. ,; .. kets at a cost greater the pr9ject'S return. The model takes as 
given the managerial utility function, and in particular it does not allow for 
changing compensation schemes in order to eliminate the short-term bias. 
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Furthermore, Stein does not consider managerial reputation concerns and 
only analyzes the steady state. 
In general, papers analyzing the issue of ma.nagerial horizon have adopted 
the following set of assumptions. First, the amount of capital available to 
managers is taken as given, and it is investigated whether managers allocate 
efficiently the capital amount between short and long-term projects. This 
assumption may be adequate if the firm is severely credit constrained, but 
there are many relevant situations in w-hich this is clearly not the case. It 
is therefore interesting to analyze what happens when managers have the 
possibility of raising money in capital markets to finance new projects. 
Second, the managerial compensation scheme is taken as given. While 
it may be unrealistic to assume that complete contracts are possible, this is 
obviously a disturbing assumption. 
Third, it is assumed (following the tradition of Narayanan (1985) and 
Holmstrom and Ricart i Costa (1986)) that managerial ability enters addi-
tively the revenue function, so that its effect on the firm's performance is 
independent of the project's size. Again, while this assumption may be a 
sensible one in some circumstances, it is interesting to study an alternative 
formulation in which there is an interplay between managerial ability and 
projects size. We will consider the simplest functional form with such prop-
erty, making total revenue depending on the product between managerial 
ability and project size. 
We find out that the possibility of external financing is basically irrele-
vant in g'euerating the short-termist reslilt, while short-termism disappears 
when compensation schemes can be optimally designed. Furthermore, we 
show that when ability interacts with revenue then short-term project have 
an information value, which is absent in the additive case. This implies that 
the first best investment policy may precribe the implementation of short-
term projects with negative NPV, since the financial loss is compensated by 
the value of the information generated by the project. Furthermore, even in 
the case in which only short-term contracts are allowed, the first-best invest-
ment policy can be implemented by appropriately choosing the managerial 
compenation schemes. 
The result suggests an alternative explanation of why short-termism may 
be observed. An external observer who looks only at the financial return of 
the investment projects will observe that on average short-term projects have 
a lower return than long-term ones. This may lead to the conclusion that 
managers are wrongly implementing 'too many' short-term projects. We 
suggest a~ alternative explanation of why this may occur. Profit-maximjzing 
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managers may choose short-term projects with a lower return because they 
generate information which helps the managers to increase the value of the 
firm in later periods. Since the result of short-term projects is observed 
quickly, the information generated is particularly valuable. In other words, 
short-termism is not the result of managerial misbehavior, but it i the con-
sequence of an optimal experimentation policy. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses what 
happens in previous models of short-termism when the possibility of raising 
external capital in capital markets in order to finance investment projects is 
introduced. We also observe in this section that the possibility of optimally 
designing managerial compensation schemes eliminates short-termism. Sec-
tion 3 introduces an alternative model in which managerial ability interacts 
with projects size. We analyze the:first best policy, and show that it leads 
to the implementation of negative NPV short-term projects. In section 4 we 
analyze what happens when managers can be offered contracts depending 
on performance. We show that the :first best is attained even if attention 
is restricted to short-term contracts. At last, section 5 contains the conclu-
SIons. 
2 External Financing 
lV10dels discussing the issue of managerial hQrizon can be divided in two 
classes. In the first class managers are characterized by an unknown (both 
to the manager and to the market) ability parameter. Their future wage 
depends on the estimate of such parameter. Since current firm's performance 
is l1sed to update the estimate of man agerial ability, short-termism results 
from an at-tempt by managers to improve market's perception of their ability 
by boosting short-term performance. N arayanan (1985) was the :first to make 
this argument. 
The second class of models takes as given the managerial utility function, 
assuming that a positive weight is put on the current stock price. Managers 
try to increase the current stock price by artificially inflating short-term 
results at the expense of long-term performance. Models in this tradition 
include Stein (1989) and Bebchuk and Stole (1993). 
In this section we want to see what happens when the possibility of 
raising funds in capital markets is introduced. In order to avoid a time-
consuming review of the whole literature we consider just two papers, rep-
resentative of the two classes of models discussed above. Narayanan (1985) 
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will be used as the basis for the discussion of models based on managerial 
reputation, while Bebchuk and Stole (1993) will be used to discuss models 
of signaling. 
2.1 Reputational Models 
In the N arayanan model a manager with ability 'Y lives T periods. For 
simplicity, let T = 2. At the beginning of the first period 'Y is normally 
distributed N (-yo,O"-y). The output of a firm employing a manager of ability 
'Y at time t is given by: 
Yt='Y+ht+Et 
where ht is the result of some investment decision and Et is a stochastic term 
which is normally distributed N (0, O"E) and independent of 'Y. The interest 
rate is zero.:. and everybody is risk neutral. 
At time 1, the manager can take two mutually exclusive actions. The 
first one is the implementation of a short-term project yielding k < 1 at 
the end of period 1, while the second is the implementation of a long-term 
project yielding 1 at the end of period 2. Both projects are worthy, but 
the long-term project is better. Since the projects are mutually exclusive, 
the action that maximizes the value of the firm is the implementation of 
the long-term project. The labor market is competitive and only one-period 
contracts are available. The implication is that at the beginning of each 
period the manager is paid a wage equal to the expected value of its ability. 
The market cannot observe whether the manager implements the short-term 
or the long-term project. Under this circumstance, it is easy to see that the 
only equilibrium is that the manager implements the short-term project, in 
an attempt to increase Yl and the market anticipates this, thus updating 
correctly the distribution of 'Y. 
The result heavily relies on the fact t]lat the implementation of the short-
term and the long-term project are mutually exclusive. One possible inter-
pretation is that there is a fixed amount of funds which can be invested in 
one or the other project. The market can observe the total amount of funds 
invested, but it cannot observe whether the funds are invested in long-term 
or short term projects. Under this interpretation it is clear that short-
termism disappears when managers can raise funds in capital markets, as 
long as there is a maximum amount that can be invested in each project. 
To see this, consider the following reformulation of the model. There 
are two projects, one short-term and one long term. Both pro jecte require 
a fixed investment I. The short term project delivers I + k at the end 
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of the first period, while the long term project yields 1 + 1 at the end of 
the second period. Funds can be obtained in competitive capital markets 
at zero interest rate. The equilibrium in this case is that the manager 
borrows an amount 21 at the beginning of period 1 and invests in both 
projects. The market observes the amount borrowed and correctly infers 
that both projects are implemented. Therefore, short-termism disappears 
and efficiency is attained. 
However, we should not jump to the conclusion that short-termism does 
not survive when capital markets can be used to finance investment projects. 
Such result depends on the assumption that only a fixed and known amount 
of funds could be invested in each class of projects. Consider the following 
natural generalization of the model. At time 0 the manager can invest 
and amount KB in short-term projects and Kl in long-term projects. An 
investment KB yields S (KB) at the end of period 1, while an investment 
Kl yields L ( Kl) at the end of period 2. Assume that Sand L are strictly 
increasing and concave functions such that S (0) = L (O) = O. Given a zero 
interest rate the efficient amount of investment maximizes: 
Let KB and K be the efficient levels of investment in the short and in 
the long term project respectively, and define K = KB + K as the total 
amount needed for efficient investment at time zero. It is not an equilibrium 
that the manager borrows K at time zero and then invests the quantities 
KB and K in the short and long term projects. The reason is exactly the 
same as in the original N arayanan model: Since the market cannot observe 
directly how much of current performance is due to ability and how much to 
short-term investment, for any given expectation of KB* the manager wants 
to maximize the amount spent in the short term projects. Therefore, the 
manager will put all available capital in the short-term projects and zero in 
the long term projectl . 
It therefore appears that in reputational models the presence of short-
termism does not depend on how the funds for investment are obtained 
(retained profits or capital markets). If the market cannot observe how 
I This extreme results depends on the assumption that the manager only lives two 
period, so that the second period performance has no influence on the future wage. IT the 
manager were to live T > 2 periods the effect would be less extreme, but underinvestment 
in the long-term project and overinvestment in the short-term projects woul<;l still be 
present. 
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much capital is devoted to the short-term project then a short-term bias 
will be present whenever the marginal return from short-term investment is 
positive2 • The result holds a fortiori when the market cannot observe the 
total amount of investment, and not only its division between short and long 
term projects. 
2.2 Signalling Models 
In the Bebchuk and Stole (1993) model a manager is given a fixed amount 
of capital K. The manager decides the quantity K 8 to be invested in the 
short-term project, with the residual quantity KZ to be invested in the long-
term project. Such quantities yield an amount 5 = S (K8) + E at time 1, 
with E a white noise, and L (KZ) at time 2. The world lasts two periods, the 
interest rate is zero and everybody is risk-neutral. At the end of period 1 
investors observe 5, and they may try to use such signal to infer the amount 
invested in the long-term project. The value of the firm at the end of the 
first period is therefore: 
VI = 5 + E [ 11 5] 
where the notation 1 is used to indicate that investors may be uncertain 
over the amount of capital put in the long term project (and consequently 
on its outr...ome L). 
In the second period the outcome of the long-term project is also ob-
served, so that the value of the firm becomes: 
V2 =5+L 
Managers are assumed to maximize the following utility function: 
with 0:1 > 0 and 0:2 > O. One way to interpret this assumption is that 
managers are risk-neutral and their compensation depends linearly on the 
stock price in both periods. Managers maximize their expected utility, so 
that they solve: 
Assuming that E. has a sufficiently wide range" in a pure strategy N ash equi-
lIbrium the investors have fixed expectations on K 8 which do no\change 
2This condition is violated in the case of investment projects of fixed sjze. 
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upon observing S. This implies that E ( 1..1 S) does not depend on KB. It is 
now easy to check that, whenever 0:1 > 0, the:first order conditions for utility 
maximization do not coincide with the condition for efficient investment (see 
Bebchuk and Stole (1993) for details). The consequence is overinvestment 
in the short-term project and underinvestment in the long-term project. 
Consider now the case in which projects can be financed raising funds 
in capital markets. Suppose again that the interest rate is zero and that 
the market observes the total amount KB + Kl = K borrowed on capital 
markets3. 
When investors observe an amount of capital K raised in capital mar-
kets they expect that the amounts KB, Kl allocated to short and long term 
projects will be obtained solving problem (1). Let Kl (K) be the amount 
invested in the long term project when K is available, so that KB (K) = 
K - Kl (K) . It turns out that Kl (K) is o~tained solving the :first order 
condition: 
(2) 
How much capital will the manager raise? Given our assumptions on Sand 
L, the function Kl (K) is differentiable. Furthermore, we have: 
Then the manager solves: 
The :first order condition is: 
Using (2) we obtain: 
L' (Kl) = 0:1 + 0:2 
dKI 
0:2 + 0:1dJ( 
(3) 
3Given the greater degree of transparency of external capital markets this appears a 
reasonable hypothesis. Furthermore, we are trying to be as close as possible to the original 
Bebchuk-Stole model, where the amount of capital K available to the £inn is known. 
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Furthermore, differentiating both sides of (2) with repect to K we obtain: 
dKl S" (1< - Kl) 
dK = S" (K - Kl) + 0I.1%2 L" (Kl) 
so that ~~ E (0,1). We conclude that L' (Kl) > land underinvestment in 
the long··term project occurs. Analogously, combining (2) and (3) we have: 
(4) 
Therefore S' (K8) < 1 and overinvestment occurs, as in the case in which 
funds were internally generated. 
The conclusion is that in signalling models of short-termism, allowing 
for external financing of investment project generates the same results as in 
the case in which funds are internally generated. 
2.3 Optimal Compensation Schemes 
Models of short-termism invariably take the compensation scheme for man-
agers as given. It is easy to see that both in Narayanan (1985) and in 
Bebchuk and Stole (1993), when the compensation scheme can be changed 
in order to provide incentives for correct investment decision then the first 
best is achieved. This holds both with and without the possibility of ex-
ternal financing. In Bebchuck and Stole it is sufficient to set a1 = o. In 
N aranyan, it is obvious that the problem can be solved if the manager can 
sign a two-period contract and commit to stay in the firm. However, even if 
no such commitment it is possible to induce efficient investment using only 
short-term contract. The trick in this case is to make the compensation of 
young managers to depend negatively on first period performance. This neg-
ative dependence counterbalances the positive effect on reputation induced 
by current performance. We will further discuss.the issue of the optimal 
compensation scheme in the following sections. 
3 Ability Interacts with Project Size 
As previouly oberved, models of short-termism based on repuational rea-
sons usually assume that managerial ability has an additive impact on the 
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firm's revenue, thus implying that there is no interaction between manage-
rial ability and the size of the investment projects. We want to explore 
what happens when we introduce the alternative assumption that the effect 
of managerial ability on the revenue of the firm is larger when invetment 
projects are 'bigger'. 
We consider the following model. Each manager lives 2 periods and is 
characterized by an ability parameter 1', drawn from a distribution with 
mean 1'0 and variance 0';. Ability is not observable by anybody, including 
managers. Managers are risk neutral, there interest rate is zero and no moral 
hazard problem exists. 
At the beginning of each period t there are two projects. The first 
project is a short-term one, and produces a return (1' + eS ) R (Kt) at the 
end of period t, where es is a parameter, R is the return function and Kt 
is the amount of capital invested in the short-term project. The other is 
a long-term one, producing a return (1' + ez) R ( K~) at the end of period 
t + 1, where ez is a parameter, and K~ is the amount of capital invested in 
the long-term project. The two parameters (es , ez) are known to everybody. 
The manager can finance projects borrowing money on the capital market. 
The amount of capital obtained by the managers in each period is observed, 
but the division of capital between short-term and long-term projects is not. 
The following assumption will be maintallied on R. 
Assumption 1 The function R is positive, twice differentiable, R (0) = 0, 
It (K) > 0 for each K, It' (K) < 0 for each K, It (0) < +00. 
The total revenue of the firm at any time t is the result of managerial ability, 
past investments and a random shock: 
where €t is a white noise. At each period t capital can be raised paying an 
interest r = O. 
Assumption 2 The variable l' and €t are independent and normally dis-
tributed, with l' '" N ( 1'0,0';), and €t '" N (0,0':). 
For future reference, define r"{ = :h- and rE = ;h. 
(T-y (T. 
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3.1 A Simple Example 
We start analyzing a very simple model which provides intuition for the 
main results, and then proceed to generalize it. 
We assume that projects have fixed size j(. This means that F (K) = K 
and the amount of capital that can be chosen is fixed at level j(. Further-
more, 1 < 1'0 + Os < 1 and 1'0 + (f > 1. 
We want to find the:first best investment policy. Since the interest rate 
is zero, it is clear that the long-term project has a positive NPV and should 
therefore be implemented. The short-term project has a negative NPV, but 
this does not imply that it should not be implemented. The reason is that, 
while the expected financial rate of return is less than the cost of capital, 
the performance on the short-term project generates additional information 
on managerial ability. This superior information can then be exploited in 
period 2 to decide the investment policy. If, for example, as a consequence 
of a strong performance in the short-term project the expected value of 
managerial ability is revised to 1'1 > 1'0, then it may be the case that invest-
ment in the short-term project in period 2 becomes optimal. Analogously, 
a downward revision may discourage investment in the long-term project in 
the second period. Let us define ;y and 1 as the solutions to: 
;y = 1- Os 
Thus, ;y is the lowest expected value of l' such that the short-term project in 
the second period becomes profitable, and 1 is the lowest expected value of l' 
such that the long-term project in the second period becomes unprofitable. 
Notice that ;y > 1'0> l' For a given level of investment j( in'the short run 
project define: 
The variable PI is observable, since Yl is observable and the other parameters 
are known. Furthermore: 
PI = l' +Vl 
where l' and VI are normal and independent random variables, and the pre-
cision of VI is j(2re. Therefore, when the short-term project is implemented 
at time 1, the revised expectation is given by: 
10 
The precision of the revised expectation over, is given by: 
-2 
71 = 7"( +K 7e 
Let us now define: 
71"8 Cl) - (Cl + (18) -1) k 
~CI) - ((,+OZ) -l)k 
(5) 
Notice that, if,m is the expected value of, then E (7I"i (,)) = 7I"i (,m), with 
i = s,l. Let US now define V (k) as the value of the firm when the short 
term project is implemented in period 1. Then: 
v(k) = 7I"8(,0)+~(,0)+EI[max{0,7I"8('I)}]+ (6) 
El [max {O, 7I"l ('1) }] (7) 
where the expectation El is taken with respect to,I (the expected value of 
, conditional to PI when the short-term project in implemented in period 1). 
The first term is the expected value of a short term project at time 1, and 
given our assumptions it will be negative. The second term is the expected 
value of the long term project in the first period, a positive term. The third 
term is the value of the short term project in the second period. The project 
will be implemented only if,I ~ 1, i.e. if the signal on managerial ability 
at time 1 is sufficiently high. The fourth term is the value of the long-term 
project in the second period. The project will be implemented unless,I ~ 2, 
i.e. unless the signal on managerial ability at time 1 is sufficiently low. 
When the short-term project is not implemented in the first period, then 
it is not implemented in the second period as well. The long-term project is 
instead implemented in both periods with probability 1. If we define V (0) 
the value of the firm when the first period project is not implemented we 
have: 
V (0) = ~ (,0) + ~ CIa) 
Since El (7I"l ('1)) = 7I"l (,0) we can write: 
V (k) - V (O) = 71"8 CIa} + El [max {O, 71"8 ClI)}] + (8) 
E [max {O,~ ('I)} - 7I"l ('1)] 
Using the definitions in (5) this becomes: 
V (k) - V (0) = 71"8 CIa) + kEI [max {O"I - 1}] + 
KE [max {0,1-,I}] 
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Let us analyze the terms in this expression. The first term is simply the cost 
of implementing the short-term project in period 1 (recall that nB (To) < 
0). The second term is the value of increased opportunities for short-term 
investment in the second period due to the new information accrued in the 
first period. It is equivalent to K call options with exercise price 'Y on the 
value of managerial ability. The third denotes the savings which are made 
when, as a consequence of better information on managerial ability, the 
long-term project is not implemented in the second period. It is equivalent 
to K put options on managerial ability with exercise price 1. 
The conclusion is that it is optimal to implement the short-term project, 
despite the negative NPV, if V (K) - V (0) ~ O. This happens when the 
increase in value of the firm due to better information is greater than the 
cost of generating such information. 
3.2 Variable Project Size 
When the project has variable size then an expression similar to (8) can be 
obtained. Define: 
n B (9, K) _ (9 + OB) R (K) - K 
n
l (9, K) - (9 + oL) R (K) - K 
so that n B (9,K) is the NPV obtained implementing the short-term project 
when managerial ability is 9 and the capital invested in K (and similarly 
for nB (9,K)).-Let us now define KB (,d as the amount of capital solving: 
and Kl (/1) as the analogous quantity for long term projects: 
Thus, these are the efficient levels of capital to be chosen in the last period 
when the expected value of managerial ability is 11' Then define: 
7fl (')'1) = n l ( 11, Kl (/1) ) 
The value of the firm when an amount K is invested in the short-term 
project at period 1 is given by: 
12 
v (K) = ?TB (')'o,K) +;;rl (')'0) + El [*B (')'1)] +El [;;rl (')'1)] (9) 
where El denotes that expectation of ')'1 is taken using the probability distri-
bution generated when the amount K is invested in the short-term project. 
Let us take a closer look to the distribution of ')'1' For a given level of 
investment K define: 
so that: 
PI = ')' +V1 
The revised expectation is therefore given by:. 
_ 7"( R2 (K) 7«; _ 
')'1 = E hi PI) - (-) ')'0 + 2 (-) Pl-
7"( + R2 K 7«; 7"( + R K ~ 
7"( R2 (I() 7«; R (K) 7«; 
(
_) ')'0 + (_) ')' + (_) El 
7"( + R2 K 7«; 7"( + R2 K 7«; 7"( + R2 K 7«; 
-This implies that, upon choosing K, the variable ')'1 will have mean ')'0 and 
varIance: 
Notice that the profit functions ifB (')'1) and 7rl (')'1) are convex, since: 
Fmthermore, they are non-negative, since K = 0 is feasible and yields zero 
NPV. In general, * (')'1) will be a continuous function taking value 0 up to 
some point ')'* and increasing thereafter, and there is some K* that maximizes 
the expression. Again, *B (')'o,K*) is the price that the firm is willing to 
pay in order to increase the information about the manager and therefore 
increase the accuracy of the investment choices in the following periods. 
This discussion leads to the following proposition. 
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Proposition 1 If managerial ability enters multiplicatively the revenue func-
tion then it may be optimal to implement short-term projects with negative 
NPV. 
When the impact of managerial ability is multiplicative rather than ad-
ditive (as in the papers following the tradition of Narayanan (1985) and 
Holmstrom and Ricart i Costa (1986)) it turns out that the implementation 
of negative NPV short-term projects may have nothing to do with short-
termism. Rather, it may well be part of a value-maximizing strategy which 
involves some rational experimentation intended to learn more about man-
agerial ability. When ability enters revenue additively, this 'experimentation 
value' of the implementation of short-term projects is absent. 
This has the following empirical implication. Suppose that we observe 
that investment projects with a short life are on average less profitable 
than long-term projects, maybe up to the point that the NPV of short-
term projects is negative. This result may have two different explana-
tions. The first one is the traditional 'overinvestment' theory previously 
dllicussed. However, remember that the theory relied on sub-optimal com-
pensation schemes for the managers. The alternative explanation is the one 
offered in this paper: Negative NPV projects are optimally implemented 
because of their information value, and they are not incompatible with 
value-maximizing behavior on the part of managers. We will show in the 
next section that it is possible to design optimally managerial compensation 
schemes so that managers maximize the value of the firm. 
4 Variable Compensation Schemes 
In this section we want to analyze what happens when ability enters the 
revenue function in a multiplicative way and long-term labor contracts are 
impossible. This is useful in order to see whether the short-termist conclu-
sions obtained in the previous literature (in which ability entered additively) 
still hold. 
In line with the rest of the literG1ture, we. assume that the managerial 
labor market is competitive. With risk-neutral firms and managers this 
implies that the expected payment of managerial compensation is equal to 
the expected profit of the firm. Therefore, a manager at period 1 with an 
expected value of ability 11 is offered: 
(10) 
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where we have assumed that in period 1 the manager will invest at the level 
that maximizes the value of the firm. 
The wage offered to the manager in the first period depends on the 
behavior that such wage scheme is expected to induce. We will first discuss 
the case in which managers can only be offered fixed wages, and we will 
see that in this case the outcome is in general inefficient. We will next 
proceed to show that when the wage scheme can depend on the first period 
performance Y1 then the first best can in general be achieved. 
4.1 Constant Wages 
We first analyze what happens when firms are constrained to offer constant 
compensation schemes to their managers. Suppose that the manager has 
raised an amount of capital K and that she is paid a constant wage WO. Let 
w* (Y1) be the wage that the manager will command in the next period if Y1 
is realized today (notice that the function w* depends on the level K8 that 
the market expects the manager to choose today). When the first period 
wage is constant the maximization problem for the manager is: 
where we have highlighted the dependence of Y1 on K8. In this case the 
following proposition is obtained. 
ProposiHon 2 Assume that managers are paid a constant wage in the first 
period. There is no equilibrium in which K 8 > 0 and K* - K 8 > O. Either 
all capital is put in the shorl-term or in the long-term prv;"ect. 
Proof. When K 8 > 0 the revised value of managerial ability 1'1 is given by: 
To R2 (K8)TE 
1'1 =Eblp1)= T"Y+ R2"Y(K8)TE1'O+ T"Y+R2(K8)T/1 (11) 
where: 
(12) 
If the actual amount of capital invested in the short-term project is K then 
_ 8 R(K) 8 e1 
PI - (1'+0 ) R(K8) -0 + R(K8) 
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so that it is convenient for the manager to increase K as much as possible. 
This implies KB = K*, and no capital is put in the long-term project. 
On the other hand, when the market expects all the capital to be invested 
in the long-term project, then the manager has no interest in trying to fool 
the market diverting capital to the short term project. To see this, observe 
that when the market expects KB = 0 then Yt = E, so the market disregards 
Yl in assessing managerial ability. In such a situation the manager has no 
incentive to artificially increase the value of Yt by shifting capital to the 
short-term project. • 
The proposition implies inefficient investment whenever the optimal in-
vestment policy requires a positive investment in both the long-term and 
the short-term project. Observe that the equilibrium in which all capital 
is invested in the long-term project would not survive if managerial ability 
appeared additively in the revenue function of the firm. In that case Yt 
is always an informative signal about managerial ability, so the manager 
is always interested in diverting capital to short-term project in order to 
boost Yl. When managerial ability affects the revenue only when applied 
to projects, things are different. In this case when the market does not 
expect a positive level of investment in the short-term project, short-term 
performance is not considered relevant in assessing managerial ability. This 
in turn implies that managers have no incentives in boosting short-term 
performance. 
How much capital will the manager raise? IT the firm can impose limits 
on the amount that the manager can borrow, then the limit will depend on 
the behavior of the manager after capital has been raised. If the manager 
is expected to invest in the long-term project then the amount chosen will 
be the one that maximizes 7tl (K) . IT the manager is expected to invest in 
the short-term project then it is better for the firm not to hire any manager 
(or, equivalently, impose K = 0 and offer a salary of zero). IT firms cannot 
impose limits on the amount of capital that the manager can raise then it 
is not profitable to hire a manager if she is expected to invest only in short 
term projects. 
4.2 Optimal Compensation Schemes 
If firms are allowed to offer a wage W (Yl, K) depending on the outcome in 
the first period and on the total amount of capital obtained (which are the 
verifiable variables in our model) then the first best can be achieved despite 
the impossibility of long-term contracts. 
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Proposition 3 There exists a wage scheme 'w (YI, K) which induces effi-
cient investment. 
Proof. Let K Band Kl be the efficient amount of investment in the short 
and long term project respectively, and let K = KB + KI. Let w· (YI) be 
the wage obtained by the manager in the second period when the market 
has observed YI and believes that an amount KB was invested in the firot 
period. Since the wage can be made dependent on K, we can assume that 
the manager can be forced to borrow the 'right' amount of capital (we can 
think of setting w (', K) = -00 if K i= K). If K is observed, the wage 
function offered to the manager is: 
where band c are positive parameters chosen to satisfy the condition: 
C (OB + 1'0) 
b = 2 [COB + 1'0)2 + 0';] F (KB) (13) 
The maximization problem for the manager is: 
Substituting Wo (YI) and YI the problem becomes equivalent to: 
which in turn becomes: 
The first order condition implies that: 
Using F' > 0 we have: 
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which yields K8 = K8 once ~ is substituted from (13) .• 
Will managers be offered in equih"brium the wage scheme inducing effi-
cient investment? Let Wo (YI) be the wage schedule inducing the efficient 
investment (K8, [(l). Given risk neutrality, the firm can always offer to the 
manager a wage a + Wo (YI) such that: 
where the expectation on YI is taken assuming an investment K8 in the 
short-term project. A manager accepting such a wage will receive a total 
expected payoff of: 
7f8 ( /0) + 7fl (/0) + E [7f8 (/1) + ~ (/1) ] 
where the expectation on /1 is taken assuming that [(8 was invested in the 
first period. This is clearly the highest utility that a manager can obtain, 
since it implies that the intertemporal value of the firm is maximized and 
entirely appropriated by the manager. 
5 Conclusion 
This paper has analyzed the robustness of results about short-termism ap-
pearing in the literature to three important aspects: 
1. The possibility to raise external capital to finance investment projects. 
2. The possibility of introducing optimal compensation schemes. 
3. The interaction between managerial ability and project size. 
Our conclusion is that the possibility of raising external capital is not im-
pOl-tant, while the possibility of introducing optimal compensation schemes 
is crucial. We have shown that even if long-term contracts are impossible, it 
is possible to design short-term contracts such that the first best is achieved. 
The interaction between managerial ability and project size may help to 
explain why the public may perceive short-termism where none is present. 
We have shown that, under the optimal compensation scheme, managers 
implement projects with negative NPV because such projects generates early 
information on managerial ability which is then optimally incorpoJ;'ated in 
the investment decisions of subsequent periods. 
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